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RHETORIC AND REALISM:
THE FIRST DIET DEBATES ON JAPAN S MILITARY
POWER
Sheila A. Smith1
Article 9 has been the focus of legislative debate since Japanese
leaders concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, ending the
U.S. Occupation of their country. Conservatives and progressives alike
gh c ide ha hi e c
i i
ea f Ja a
a
defenses, and how it was to be translated into a rearmament policy. Until
a new law was passed to create the Self Defense Force in 1954, these
Diet debates offer a fascinating window on the effort to define what
Article 9 meant, and the issues that provoked contention among political
parties.2
Most of the critical questions regarding how to interpret Article
9 emerged in the first Diet debates of 1952-54 over the creation of
Ja a
a i i a . E e h gh he a a i f e h i he
minds of most Japanese, Diet members had to consider how best to
ide f he c
defe e a he K ea Wa he ed i a e
era of major power competition, this time cleaved by an ideological
c a h be ee
cia i a d ca i a i . Ja a
i icia a had
confront the reality, so amply demonstrated at the end of World War II,
that they had to do so in an era of nuclear weapons.
Rearmament was unavoidable, but its logic was far from clear in
those initial postwar years. While navigating a new relationship with the
United States, the government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had
to rebuild a nation. Part of that process was deciding what steps were
needed to ensure its security. The world was far from steady in the wake
f he K ea Wa , a d Ja a
e
ce e e i
a e. D e ic
instability h e ed c e
he
face a Ja a
egi a
ied
govern under their new Constitution. Politicians varied widely in their
ii
he a i
defe e eed .
I am grateful to Izumi Fujiwara and Lizhong Yang for research assistance for this
article.
2 F
ece a a i f Ja a
c e
a deba e e i
iia
e , ee
SHEILA A. SMITH, JAPAN REARMED: THE POLITICS OF MILITARY POWER (Harvard
Univ. Press 2019); ANDREW OROS, JAPAN S SECURITY RENAISSANCE (Columbia
Univ. Press 2017); and SADO AKIHIRO, THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES AND POSTWAR
POLITICS IN JAPAN (Noda Makito trans., Japan Publishing Industry Foundation for
Culture 2017).
1
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I a
Ja a
egi a
i e e ha A ic e 9 ea
for the defense of the country. Analyzed here are the early deliberations
be ee he Cabi e e be f P i e Mi i e Y hida g e
e
a d Ja a Die e be
h
c f
he he ica e ai
contained in Article 9. While there was no advocacy for challenging the
idea that Japan would not use force aggressively, judgments on what
Japan could do to defend itself varied considerably. For some, a police
and coast guard were sufficient, while for others, a military was
indispensable. The discussions eventually led to the legislation that
created the Self Defense Force (SDF) in 1954. But what was also clear
from the early days of these deliberations is the defining role of the
U i ed S a e i ha i g Ja a
i i a ch ice . Re i g
he U.S.
was acceptable to some, but deeply problematic for others.
ARTICLE 9: TRANSLATING RHETORIC INTO POLICY
Japan emerged from occupation with a new Constitution, one
written for it by the staff of the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers but one that gradually was embraced by the Japanese people.
When the Constitution was drafted in 1946, it was designed to
demilitarize an aggressive nation. It was revolutionary in its intent; but
it has been used by postwar Japanese as the premise of their engagement
i h he
d: Ja a f eig
ic
d
ge e
iia
power as its primary instrument. 3
ARTICLE 9. (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international
peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation
and the threat or use of force as means of settling
international disputes.
(2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war

Today as Prime Minister Abe seeks to amend Article 9, he has no interest in changing
the language of the first paragraph. Others in the LDP would like to rewrite the second
paragraph, but Abe seeks to add another few sentences to the effect that the existing
Self Defense Force is constitutional. The LDP has yet to incorporate this suggestion
in a new draft, however. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Japan s Constitutional
Debate (Nov. 5, 2019, 12:36 AM), https://www.cfr.org/interactive/japanconstitution/.
3
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potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. 4
The two paragraphs of Article 9 represented a complex bargain
between the staff of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers, and the Japanese politicians who led
their country under occupation. The first paragraph, which committed
he Ja a e e e e
f e e e
ce a a a ea
f e i g
i e a i a di
e , a g age a ake f
a di
a ic ac
made after World War I by many nations interested in forestalling war.
Ye Ja a g e
e did
acce f di a a e , a d a g ed f
the inherent right of self-defense as stipulated in the Charter of the new
United Nations.5
O ce
e eig
a e ed, h e e , Ja a
i ica
leaders had to grapple with how to provide for external defense.
Legi a i e deba e bega
h
c ide Ja a
e e a defe e
eed . The Die
e i ha i g he c
f Ja a
iia
e
began with the legislation for creating the SDF, and many of the ideas
and the differences that emerged then continued to shape policy-making
for decades thereafter. 6 Legalistic, and at times, euphemistic, Diet
NIHONKOKU KENP [KENP ] [CONSTITUTION] (Japan),
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
5 Thi i e
eai
f he UN Cha e
a g age a e i i g Ja a
igh f
self-defense was put forward in Diet committee debates put forward when the
Constitution was being drafted in 1946. The chair of the review committee for the Bill
for Revision of the Imperial Constitution, Liberal Party member Ashida Hitoshi,
oversaw the Diet deliberations on how to amend the draft presented by SCAP. Ashida
is credited with finding the compromise between Socialist and Kaishinto Party
members on Article 9 that allowed Japan to claim the right of self-defense. For a full
discussion of his role, see MIYANO NOBORU, SAIGO NO LIBERARISUTO - ASHIDA
HITOSHI (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1987).
6 For the first several decades post World War II, citizens used the Japanese courts
cha e ge he g e
e
defe e ch ice , a ic a
he c i ed
presence of U.S. military forces on Japanese soil. But the courts also began to
hear cases of cha e ge
he g e
e
i e eai
f A ic e 9. I 1973,
the District Court of Sapporo ruled the SDF unconstitutional in the Naganuma
Nike case, prompted by the SDF plan to install radar and missile systems in a
national forest. The Sapporo High Court overturned the ruling on a technicality,
a d Ja a
S e eC
he d he High C
i g. The Ja a e e S e e
C
ha ef ed
e
he c
i i a i i e, c ai i g ha he a i
defenses are best determined by the legislature ( efe e ce
he
i ica
e i
e). F a e ce e
e ie
f he e ega deba e , ee Sa i
Umeda, Law Library of Congress, Japan: Article 9 of the Constitution, LAW
LIBRARY
OF
C ONGRESS
(2006),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japanconstitution/article9.php. For a more detailed history of the Naganuma Nike case
4
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debates matter most in shaping public understanding of the constraints
(hadome) i
ed
Ja a
a
i itary. This political
interpretation of Article 9 in the Diet reflected the shifting contours of
political compromise on what the Self Defense Force (SDF) can and
cannot be allowed to do.
Over time, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats developed the
rhetorical framework within which military power would be justified.
New words would be created, for weapons and for operations, that
conformed to the language of Article 9. 7 Bureaucrats carried around a
text full of Diet testimony that set the precedent for future decisions.
Few challenged the language of the first paragraph of Article 9, but at
he ce e f Ja a
a deba e e i i a
e a he ec d
paragraph. Perhaps the most important debates surrounded the meaning
f he h a e a
e ia ,
senryoku. Defining the meaning of war
potential was central to determining how to rearm.
A word that does not appear in Article 9, however, has been just
as important: jieiken, or the right of self-defe e. A Ja a
i icia
considered the U.S. Occ a i
a h i ie d af f hei
e
Constitution, they pointed to the UN Charter and argued that all nations
had an inherent right to defend themselves. This interpretation of Article
9 beca e he e i e f Ja a
ea a e , a d he i i ed urpose
f Ja a
iia
a ef ec ed i i
a e, he Se f Defe e F ce
(jieitai).8
a d he j dicia
e i de e i i g he c
i i ai
f Ja a
SDF, ee
William R. Slomanson, Judicial Review of War Renunciation in the Naganuma
Nike Case: Juggling the Constitutional Crisis in Japan, 9 C ORNELL INT L L.J. 24
(1975); see also Po Liang Chen & Jordan T. Wada, Can the Japanese Supreme
Court Overcome the Political Question Hurdle?, 26 W ASH. INT L L.J. 349 (2017).
7F
e a
e f he a g age de i ed e he ea
de c ibe Ja a
iia
capability and SDF missions, see Sheila A. Smith, In Search of the Japanese State, in
DOING FIELDWORK IN JAPAN 156 75 (Theodore C. Bestor et al. eds., Univ. of Hawaii
Press 2003).
8 The United Nations Charter commits its members to forego the use of military force
and to commit to a peaceful resolution of differences. It also promises a collective
e
e
i i a agg e i . H e e , i ec g i e he i he e
ight of
individual or collective self-defe e i Cha e VII, A ic e 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of
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Ja a
a
i ica eade did
acce c
ee
disarmament, and instead argued for the right of self-defense. The Diet
then became the locus of political debate over how to interpret and how
to implement that right. In the decade after Japanese regained their
sovereignty, positions on Article 9 differed considerably within and
between political parties. These differences were over what Article 9
meant for rea a e , a e a h
i a
ha e Ja a
ec i
relationship with the United States. Conservatives were also divided
over whether Japanese sovereignty required revising the document.
B i a i h a ea i ga e ha Ja a g e
e
gh o
implement their military goals. Embracing the limited purpose of their
postwar military, Yoshida Shigeru and his successors in the LDP put
forward rearmament plans that would build a military capability
sufficient for territorial defense. Supported by its alliance with the
United States, Tokyo navigated the tensions of the Cold War, and found
its place in the strategy that Washington provided for deterring nuclear
threat. Unlike U.S. allies in Europe, Japanese leaders did not seek to
shape U.S. nuclear strategy, and rarely emphasized the nuclear element
in its postwar security.
EARLY VIEWS ON JAPAN S MILITARY OPTIONS
The ba ic a k f eb i di g Ja a
iia
e
a
addressed in Diet debate in 1952-53 when legislation was being
prepared by the government of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Diet
discussions over what sort of military force Japan would need
began shortly after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on
April 28, and the Yoshida Cabinet led deliberation on rebuilding the
institutions needed to govern. Some were easier than others, and the Diet
deba e e h
ide f Ja a
e e a defenses took time.
Three Diet sessions were needed to complete the laws that officially
c ea ed he SDF a d he b ea c ac e
ib e f
a agi g Ja a
defenses, the Defense Agency. 9
the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51, https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/.
9 Ja a
a defe e eed
e e de ibe a ed i he 15 th, 16th, 17th, and 18th
Sessions of the Diet. Deliberations began on how to prepare for the defense of Japan
in the Budget Committee of the Lower House in December 1952, and then continued
in the Foreign Affairs Committee through 1953. The Upper House Budget Committee
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Political leaders were divided not only on how to consider
A ic e 9
eci i , b a
had di e ge
ie
Y hida
decision to rely on the United States against any external threats. Even
Y hida
a , he Libe a Pa , a di ided. Ha oyama Ichiro,
he i e i i e
i a
i hi he a ,
e
di ag eed i h
Yoshida on how to interpret Article 9 and he was wary of associating
Japan too closely with Washington. Shigemitsu Mamoru, a strong
proponent of Japanese rearmament and Constitutional revision, led
Kaishinto, the party most closely associated with the conservatives of
the prewar era.10 The Socialist Party was similarly divided on the issues
that shaped defense policy. Two groups within the Socialist party, a
leftist branch led by Kamikawa Jotaro and a rightist group led by Suzuki
Mosaburo, were also integral to these early deliberations. Socialists on
the left argued for unarmed neutrality; their fellow Socialists on the
right, however, were far more willing for Japan to rearm and establish
greater independence from the United States.
Initially, the Japanese government, led by Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru, resisted the idea that a new military was necessary.
Japan already had a National Safety Force (hoantai), which had been
created under the U.S. Occupation to maintain domestic order. 11 The
Director General of the Safety Agency, Kimura Atsutaro, responsible
for the maritime force, repeatedly argued that his agency was evidence
that Japan was not interested in military power and that if a foreign
c
a f
i ade (fuh shinn ), the National Safety Force
and the police were adequately prepared to respond. In short, domestic
law enforcement agencies were sufficient. When pressed by Socialist
followed with their deliberations throughout 1953 Legislation for the Self Defense
Law and the Establishment of the Defense Agency Law was presented in the 16 th
Session, and was passed in the Lower House on May 7, 1954 (by a vote of 277-138)
and in the Upper House on June 2, 1954 (by a vote of 152-79). In the wake of the
Upper House vote, however, members passed a resolution that banned the dispatch of
the SDF overseas. Subsequent conversations in the Diet would continue to focus on
h
de e
a defe i e i i a d c i e a e a
he deci i -making over
what types of weapons the SDF would be allowed to have.
10 Kaishinto is often translated into English as the Progressive Party. I have chosen to
retain the Japanese name of the party in order to avoid confusing Kaishinto with
Ja a
a
g e i e , he S cia i a d C
i
a ie . I he ea
postwar politics of Japan, Kaishinto was seen as an ultra-conservative party due to its
association with the prewar government.
11 After the war, Japan created a decentralized police force in 1947 at the direction of
Occupation authorities. It also created a National Safety Force to protect its maritime
territory. The National Safety Agency directed the National Safety Force while the
police were organized by municipality across Japan.

70

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW

[Vol. 33:64

Diet member Inamura Junzo about whether the National Safety Force
was exercising with a foreign invasion in mind, it put Kimura on the
defensive. He argued that at the time, the National Safety Force was
focused on ensuring domestic stability and the possible interference by
foreign nations in destabilizing Japan. Kimura stumbled over his
language as he claimed that dealing with foreign intervention within
Japan was different from war; he said the Constitution prevented Japan
from exercising its right to initiate war (kokken no hatsudo).12
Prime Minister Yoshida sidestepped the convoluted rhetoric that
Kimura had used, and instead presented a more pragmatic case for
i i i g Ja a
i i a ai . Ja a
d
ea beca e i had
money and because of the restraints of the Constitution. But Yoshida
a
a hi c
e e a e i
e diffe e
ha Ki
a.
Reflecting the idea that the Cold War now pitted a group of powers
against another, Yoshida argued that the likelihood was that a
c ec i e a ack (shudanteki k geki) would need to be repelled by
c ec i e defe e e a a i
(shudanteki b bi), and that was why
Japan and the United States had concluded a bilateral security treaty. 13
Nakasone of the Kaishinto took a different tack; he pointed out
that the minesweeping operations conducted by the National Safety
Force had already supported U.S. operations in the Korean War. When
he F eig Mi i e Oka aki Ka
e ied ha Ja a
f ce e e
a
ed d
eacef
k (heiwa no shigoto), Nakasone ridiculed
his statement, saying it sounded more like something the U.S. Secretary
f S a e h d a ha
e hi g Ja a
F eig Mi i e h d. 14
Other members of the Kaishinto were less provocative, arguing that
whatever the name of the force was, it should be able to handle an
invasion of Japan. Eventually, the Kaishinto ca e a
d Y hida
way of thinking. For example, Suma Yakichiro argued in the Foreign
Affairs Committee in July of 1953 that a defense force that reflected

一
十八号 予 委員会
七号 和二十七年十二 四 [Budget
Committee of the House of Representatives, 15th Diet Session 1-9 (1952)],
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/015/0514/01512040514007.pdf.
13 Id. For a discussion of the first U.S.-Japan security treaty, see M ARTIN E.
W EINSTEIN , J APAN'S POSTWAR DEFENSE POLICY, 1947-1968 (Columbia Univ.
Press 1971).
14
一
十八号予 委員会
七号 和二十七年十二 四
[Budget
Committee of the House of Representatives, 15th Diet Session 17 (1952)],
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/015/0514/01512040514007.pdf.
12
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Ja a
di i i hed a i al strength (kokuryoku) should not require a
Constitutional revision.15
Perhaps the biggest difference among the Liberal and Kaishinto
conservatives was whether to revise the Constitution. Yoshida resisted
the connection between building a postwar military and Constitutional
revision, arguing instead that a limited military capability was consistent
with the spirit of Article 9. Hatoyama, however, was far more cautious
about rearmament, and argued that it would require revision of Article
9. The Kaishinto, with which the Liberals would ultimately align,
agreed that revision was not necessary for rearmament, but ultimately,
he
d be
b ed b he di ec i
f he Y hida Cabi e
approach to rearmament. By late 1953, Kaishinto Naka e Ya hi ,
one of the most outspoken critics of Yoshida and the Liberal Party,
began to see the postwar agreements with the U.S. as a problem.
Building a military without war potential (senryoku naki guntai) made
little sense to Nakasone. 16
YOSHIDA S POLITICAL CHOICES AFTER SAN FRANCISCO
Two meetings in 1953 outside of the Diet focused political
deliberations on rearmament. One reflected an attempt to overcome
diffe e ce
i hi he c e a i e
e h
a
ach Ja a
postwar military power. The second was a critical discussion between
Tokyo and Washington over the U.S. role in shaping the goals and the
process of Japanese rearmament. A domestic political alliance among
conservatives on rearmament was created in the Yoshida-Shigemitsu

一
五号外務委員会
十七号 和二十八年七 二十一
[Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 16th Diet Session 114 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/016/0082/01607210082017.p
df.
16 Naka
e c i ici
f he g e
e ca be f d i he 一
十八号予
委員会
二号 和二十八年十二 三 [Budget Committee of the House of
Representatives, 18th Diet Session 1-2, 13 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/
syugiin/018/0514/01812030514002.pdf; Others in Kaishinto also pressed the Yoshida
Cabinet to explain what was wrong with rearming. See 一
十八号予 委員会
三号 和二十八年十一 二
[Budget Committee of the House of
Representatives, 17th Diet Session 1-46 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sy
ugiin/017/0514/01711020514003.pdf; see also 一
十八号予 委員会
四号 和二十八年十一 三 [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives,
17th Diet Session 1-34 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/017/0514/0
1711030514004.pdf.
15
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meeting; the division of labor between a new Japanese military and U.S.
forces was created in the second.
The first meeting resulted in a compromise between Yoshida
and Shigemitsu over rearmament on September 27, 1953, in what later
became known as the Tokyo Kaidan. The Liberal and Kaishinto leaders
agreed in principle on what sort of military Japan needed and how it
would align itself in the growing tensions of the Cold War. The
Yoshida-Shigemitsu meeting set in motion the drafting by members of
their parties of principles that would guide the Diet legislation for the
Self Defense Force. Two basic principles were agreed upon: first, given
the regional security changes afoot, it was time for Japan to create a
long-term rearmament plan; and second, they would begin by turning
the National Safety Force into a Self Defense Force. 17
A second, and equally important, meeting was held between
Y hida e i a , Ikeda Ha a , a d A i a Sec e a
f Sae
Walter Robertson in Washington, D.C. the following month. The aim
was to exp e h
he U.S.
d
Ja a
ea a e . B h
governments agreed that the Soviet Union posed an imminent threat to
Ja a . Ba ed
ha a
i , hei a e
e
f Ja a
defe e
eed e e ged, b he e e e diffe e i ca e. Ikeda
e
a
plan presented far smaller ground and air forces than the U.S.
recommended. But Japanese thinking about its navy was more
expansive than that of the U.S., undoubtedly reflecting the U.S. desire
for its own navy to dominate in the Pacific. But it was the central issue
f he e f U.S. f ce i Ja a a d hei
e i Ja a defe e ha
a he c
f he ee i g. Ikeda c e ed hi g e
e
that the Japanese public would side with the Socialists should U.S.
forces remain much longer on Japanese soil, and argued for greater
military assistance for Japan. 18 U.S. officials, at the behest of Secretary
f S a e J h F e D e , d hei Ja a e e c
e a ha , Ja a
cannot expect U.S. to carry the burden over a long period with forces
SMITH, supra note 2, at 55 89.
There were multiple meetings between Ikeda and Deputy Assistant Secretary
Robertson. The details on the U.S. and Japanese views on defense planning, economic
and military assistance, and the role of U.S. forces in Japan can be found in official
cables between officials at the Embassy of Japan, the Joint Chief of Staff, and the
Department of State in Washington, DC between October 1-20, 1953. Cables from the
Embassy in Tokyo to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on October 1, 1953 reflect
the initial Ikeda R be
ee i g, a d Sec e a D e e
e
Oc be 9, 14,
and 20 reveal the U.S. expectation was nothing short of full Japanese rearmament. See
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, CHINA AND JAPAN, Vol.
XIV, Part 2, docs. 694, 698, 699, 701, 704, 713, 714 (David W. Mabon et al. eds.,
Government Printing Office 1985).
17
18
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the world over. We want to withdraw forces from Japan just as soon as
Ja a ca ake ca e f i
ec i . We
e ai a ai ab e
he . 19 For different reasons, both Tokyo and Washington were
anxious to reduce U.S. forces and prepare Japan to take over their role
i Ja a
defe e. A bi a e a M a Defe e A i a ce T ea
a
concluded, a vital step in acquiring U.S. weaponry for the newly formed
Self Defense Force. 20
Once these basic premises for rearmament were set, Diet
deliberations settled on three basic questions. First, why avoid the word
military? The National Safety Force (h antai) formed during the
occupation had served as a maritime law enforcement force, and had
housed the minesweepers sent to help U.S. forces during the Korean
War. For many, including the Director Generation of the National
Safety Agency, this force was sufficient, and it would be fine if some
saw these forces as a military. Yet to call them such was unacceptable.
Much Diet debate was conducted over why Ja a
e f ce (tai)
could not be called a military (gun). Prime Minister Yoshida began to
refine his answers to this question of definition, introducing a new
definition for how to distinguish war potential (senryoku) in November
1953.21
Kono Mitsu, a member of the rightist Socialist Party, asked
Yoshida whether the various terms used in the Yoshida-Shigemitsu
memo and in the Japan-U.S. Joint statement all conformed to the current
Constitution, revealing the range of terms now in circulation about
Japan
e
i i a : e f-defense force (jieitai), Japanese military

Id. doc. 698.
There are competing views of just how important the Ikeda-Robertson talks were in
e i g he ajec
f Ja a
defe e a . A acc
f he talks published by
Miyazawa Kiichi, who took notes during the meeting, suggested that Ikeda took a
detailed plan with him to the talks, but more recent scholarship suggests that the U.S.
Joint Chiefs were uninterested. See Uemura Hideki, Ikeda-Robertson kaidan to
b eir oku k mondai [Ikeda-Robertson Talks and the Development of Japanese
Defense Forces], 1994 KOKUSAI SEIJI 182 (1994).
21 The Director General of the Safety Force Kimura suggested that senryoku were
forces capable of a military invasion, but a member of the Hatoyama faction asked that
his comment be struck from the Diet record as it might suggest to other Asian countries
that Japanese politicians were thinking of invasion. Kimura agreed to have the word
shinra ku sens (a war of invasion) struck from the Diet record. See comments by
Miki Takeshi, 一
十八号予 委員会
四号 和二十八年十一 三
[Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 17th Diet Session 1-34 (1953)],
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/017/0514/01711030514004.pdf.
19
20
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(Nihongun), defensive military (b eitai), a Japanese defensive military
(Nihon no B eigun).22
Beyond the semantics, questions about how much military
capability would trigger a Constitutional revision remained. Here there
were a variety of views. For Ishibashi Tanzan, a member of the rightist
Socialists, it would be necessary to revise the Constitution if the
Y hida Cabi e a ed he e f ce
ha d e Ja a
e e a
defenses.23 E e
e i Y hida
a
ee
ici
f ha
the prime minster agreed to in his meeting with Kaishinto Shige i ,
pointing out that Kaishinto members seemed to think that a Self Defense
Force possessed war potential (senryoku). 24 A member of the leftist
Lab Fa e Pa , K da Hi a ,
k i e i h Y hida
di i c i be ee i di ec a d di ec i a i , ca i g Y hida idea
of developing self-defense capability as nonsense (detarame). He went
on to say that Japanese like himself - would defend Japan if the
country were attacked, implying there was no need to build a new
military system.25
But Yoshida stood firm. When subjected to Kaishinto member
Ma
a Ke
e
he e f he
d
iia
(gun),
Yoshida and Director General Kimura both replied with this intent: the
word guntai, or military, was not the issue. Rather it was the level of
their capability. Whatever they were to be a ed, Ja a f ce c d
not have the power to pursue modern warfare (kindaisen no chikara).
This was in keeping with the prohibition on war potential, (senryoku),
contained in Article 9.26
By late 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida further developed his
g e
e
hi ki g: Ja a
d e g he he Na i a Safe
一
十八号 予 委員会
四号 和二十八年十一 三 [Budget
Committee of the House of Representatives, 8 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTA
KU/syugiin/017/0514/01711030514004.pdf.
23
和二十八年十 三十一
会
三号 [Plenary Session of the House
of Representatives, 16th Session of the Diet, 35-38 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SEN
TAKU/syugiin/017/0512/01710310512003.pdf.
24 Naka
a U ekichi, a e be f Ha a a fac i i he Libe a Pa , i ed
out that after Yoshida had met with Shigemitsu, Kaishinto members began calling a
Se f Defe e F ce a
e ia (senryoku). See 一
十八号 予 委員会
三号
和二十八年十一 二
[Budget Committee of the House of
Representatives, 16th Session of the Diet, 1-46 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENT
AKU/syugiin/017/0514/01711020514003.pdf.
25 Id.
26
一
十八号 予 委員 会
四号
和二 十八年十一 三
[Budget Committee of the House of Representatives, 16th Session of the Diet, 8 (1953)]
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/017/0514/01711030514004.pdf.
22
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Force, and if it were to reach the level of having war potential
(senryoku), then it would be necessary to revise the Constitution. His
argument revolved around the need to replace the military power of the
United States. This presence of foreign troops (takoku no guntai) was a
temporary measure, he insisted, and to end it, Japan needed its own
military capability to replace it. Yoshida emphasized, however, that
Japan was nowhere near being able to build that level of capability. 27
This was far from an abstract parsing of words. One of the
backdrops to this Diet conversation on what nature of forces that Japan
would require was the seizure by South Korea of Japanese fishing
vessels. South Korean President Syngman Rhee had declared a new
aii eb
da , ca i g i a eace i e,
Ja a 18, 1952. Thi
was done after U.S. Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk had sent
correspondence to South Korea the previous year describing the U.S.
position on the maritime boundary in preparation for the San Francisco
Peace Talks. US forces on the peninsula did not challenge this line, and
ultimately approved a sea defense zone that roughly coincided with the
Rhee line. The U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo, however, pushed back, but
to no avail.28
President Rhee informed U.S. officials that any Japanese
fishermen who entered this area would be dealt with by South Korea,
and the South Korean navy began to seize Japanese fishing and
commercial vessels and detain their crews. Japan had little ability to
respond when its fishermen were captured. Still under US occupation,
On November 4, Yoshida noted that having a foreign military (takoku no guntai)
protecting Japan is a temporary measure, and this situation has to be ended through
g ad a
e g he i g f Ja a
a i a defe e . I i he e ha Y hida
e
ha if Ja a
iia
e g h eache he e e f a
e ia (senryoku), then the
Constitution would need to be revised. It was not, however, necessary at that time. See
his remarks in the 十八 予 委員会会
二号 和二十八年十一 四
「参
」 [Budget Committee of the House of Councilors, 1-28 (1953)],
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/017/0514/01711040514002.pdf.
28 See Edwin Allan Lightener, Jr., The Charge in the Republic of Korea (Lightener) to
the Department of State, in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-54,
CHINA AND JAPAN, Vol. XIV, Part 2, No. 601, 1337 (John P. Glennon ed., 1985). The
U.S. and Japanese governments both opposed the ROK navy ship seizure of Japanese
commercial and fishing vessels, and the detention of Japanese in Pusan. By 1957, the
U.S. reported that 700 ships had been seized. This dispute would continue until 1965
when Japan and the ROK concluded a normalization treaty. See Douglas MacArthur,
Telegram from the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State, in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-57, JAPAN, Vol. XXIII, Part 1, No. 226, 483
(John P. Glennon ed., 1985); Douglas MacArthur, Memorandum of a Conversation,
Tokyo, id. at No. 71, 164.
27
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the Yoshida Cabinet had to rely on the U.S. and diplomacy for a
response. The National Safety Force, the maritime law enforcement
agency, had little capability to confront Korean ships. Diet members
were unsure how Japan ought to respond, and whether Japan had the
right to act in defense of Japanese fishing vessels at the time. The
Yoshida Cabinet had yet to reach a conclusion about how other nations
might perceive the National Safety Force, as a law enforcement vessel
or as a military one. No one argued that Japan should use force against
the South Korean vessels, but some worried about what would happen
if a National Safety Force vessel were attacked. 29 In the Committee on
Foreign Affairs meeting following this discussion, a testy debate
between Hozumi Shichiro of the Socialist Party and Naiki Yoshio of the
Kaishinto erupted over how to handle the seizure of Japanese fishing
vessels by South Korea. Hozumi argued that there were some, even
within the government, who wanted to solve the problem by force
(b r oku), and Namiki challenged him to identify who those advocates
were. Hozumi asserted there were two kinds of wars, a war of selfdefense (jiei sens ) and a war of invasion (shinr aku sens ) and claimed
that those who simply advocated violence (b r oku) were not rational.30
Finally, Diet committee discussions in both the Budget
Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committees in 1953 addressed the
link between Ja a
i i a ca abi i a d he e f U.S. f ce i
Japan. The Ikeda-Robertson meeting had revealed the U.S. interest in
Japanese rearmament and suggested to some in the Diet that the U.S.
d ha e a de e i a
e i Ja a
ea a e . A
i licit
h gh
Y hida di c i
f a g ad a i c ea e i Ja a e e
military capabilities was the decrease of U.S. military forces in Japan.
31 Yoshida argued that it would best for Japan to get out from under the
On November 4, 1953, in the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Maeda Masao, the
Deputy Director General of the National Safety Agency, replied that in theory the
Japanese vessel if attacked could exercise the right of self-defense, but that the
government would have to research this further. 一
五号 外務委員会
五号
和二十八年十一 四 [Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, 17th Session of the Diet, 6 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU
/syugiin/017/0082/01711040082005.pdf.
30 See
一
五号 外務委員会
六号
和二十八年十一 七
[Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 17th Session of the
Diet, 1-20 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/017/0082/0171107008
2006.pdf.
31 Yoshida began to allude to this need for Japan to build defense capability
(boieiryoku) to replace that of departing U.S. forces in the Budget Committee
discussion on November 3, 1953: Beikoku guntai no seiwa ni naru toiu ka, h g no
motoni iru to iu ka wa narubeku hayaku yameta h ga ii [We should stop relying on
29
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military protection of the U.S. military. Miki Takeyoshi of the
Hatoyama faction of the Liberal Party made a far more compelling case,
arguing that the Constitution did not permit Japan to have the military
power necessary for defense, and he suggested that since all three of
Ja a c e a ive parties want to arm Japan and since they had a twothirds majority in the Diet, it would be wise to revise the Constitution
and create a Self Defense Military (jieigun).32
JAPAN S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SECURITY TREATY
There was another complaint against Yoshida. The security
treaty with the United States had included an article that asked for U.S.
help in the case of internal unrest. This did not sit well with many Diet
members. Moreover, U.S. role in rearming Japan was becoming suspect
as well. Yoshida vehemently denied that his government would rearm
a g he i e
f Wa hi g
a bi i
a , a d ha he
g e
e
a
i
had bee ha he Na i a Safe F ce
would sustain public order when U.S. forces would respond to a direct
invasion of Japan. But the Ikeda-Robertson talks revealed Washington
wanted Japan to move quickly to replace departing U.S. forces. The
pace of rearmament, if not the scale, would be set by Washington. Japan
would have to relieve U.S. forces faster than it expected.
Critique of the security treaty evolved into an argument for some
on the left for unarmed neutrality. There were some in the Diet that saw
a contradiction in having U.S. forces in Japan at all, since they clearly
ee
a
e ia a d hus banned under the Constitution. Others
from the leftist Socialist Party argued that any troops at all on Japanese
soil were forbidden, including UN forces. This party began to articulate
a policy of unarmed neutrality. Socialist Party member Sata Tadakata,
f e a
e, a g ed ha Ja a
a ed acifi , i h
i i a a i a ce
he ,
a
Ja a i
a a
ha b . 33
U.S. forces or being under the protection of U.S. forces as soon as we can]. 一
十八号 予 委員会
四号 和二十八年十一 三 [Budget Committee of
the House of Representatives, 7 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/
017/0514/01711030514004.pdf.
32 Id. at 13.
33 I Ja a e e, Sa a aid, hib
hei a h gi ke ji hi, g ji eki e j
a ae beki
de a ai. Nih
e
i a
ka hi e a a a .
五
外務委員会会
六号
和二十八年十一 六 「参
」[Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Councilors, 14-15 (1953)], http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/017/
0082/01711060082006.pdf.
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Here again the Yoshida Cabinet emphasized the temporary
nature of his compromise with the United States. Foreign Minister
Okazaki stated that the U.S.-Japan security treaty was not a permanent
treaty; it was a temporary one. And, in the preamble to the treaty, the
U.S.
e i e ec a i
f a g ad a i c ea e i Ja a
abi i
defend itself to counter indirect and direct invasions. Okazaki explained
ha hi ea ha Ja a defe e ca abi i ie h d g
a he U.S.
forces in Japan gradually decreased. 34
A week after this discussion, however, Vice President Richard
M. Nixon visited Japan, and created a stir.35 In a luncheon speech at the
American-Ja a S cie i T k , Ni
di ec add e ed Ja a
i
a
a egic e i he Fa Ea , ca i g i a key bastion in the
defe e f f eed
i A ia. B Ja a Na i a Safe F ce , Ni n
i ed
,c d
ef
hi i i . N
if di a a e
a
igh i 1946, h i i
g i 1953? I g i g d
e hi g ha
I hi k e ha
gh be d e
eb e ei
b ic ife. I g i g
to admit right here that the United State did ake a i ake i 1946. 36
Need e
a , Ni
ii
Ja a i
a ed a e
i
of criticism against the Yoshida Cabinet in the Diet. Kaishinto s
Nakasone Yasuhiro took aim first. In the opening Session of the Diet,
Nakasone asked what Yoshida thought when he heard Nixon state that
disarming Japan was a mistake. Yoshida demurred, saying it was a kind
speech. Nakasone thought otherwise, claiming that the constitution was
forced on Japan, and that the Japanese people think it should not be
revised because they have been led to believe it is the best in the world.
This perception, Nakasone thought, had to be undone. He said that if the
government did not provide the quality and quantity of military
capability necessary to cope with a direct invasion, it would be guilty of
slowly strangling (muzamuza migoroshi ni suru) Ja a
Na i a
Id. at 16.
The Nixon Presidential Library describes his speech as follows: Japan, a US ally and
a ca ab e f ee a i , a , acc di g RN, a ke ba i i he defe e f f eed i
A ia. H e e , d e
he di a a e
f Ja a , hich had bee e f ced b he
United States following the close of World War II in 1946, its National Safety Forces
could not fill this important global role. Nixon followed his own logic to its bold
c c i : N
if di a a e
a igh i 1946, h i i
g i 1953? I
going to do something that I think perhaps ought to be done more by people in public
ife. I g i g ad i igh he e ha he U i ed S a e did ake a i ake i 1946.
Developments by Soviet leaders have compelled the US and other nations to rearmament
and other free nations, including Japan, ought to follow suit. Karen Neis, 1953: VP
Nixon in Japan, NIXON FOUNDATION (Nov. 15, 2019, 5:55pm), https://www.nixonfoun
dation.org/2015/06/1953-vp-nixon-in-japan/.
36 Id.
34
35
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Safety Force.37 Naka e e
a ge b gh e e
e ha h a d
personal criticism of Yoshida. Nakasone accused Yoshida of
manipulating meaningless words whe he ed h a e ike a i i a
ih
a
e ia . He ca ed
Y hida
c ea e a
i ica
coalition that would allow Japan to be free finally from the Potsdam
Declaration and the San Francisco Peace Treaty instead of allowing
Nixon to come to Japan and say what he did and of allowing Korea to
make fun of Japan. Finally, he said that Nixon, the president of the
Philippines, and Mao Tse-tung were all young men, while Japan was
sinking under the weight of being governed by 75-year olds.38
The Socialists also took aim at the Yoshida Cabinet and its
rearmament plan. On the left, Aono Buichi charged the government with
a i g
e
ac ici g
de [hitogoroshi no renshu] while on
he igh , I e R ji, de a ded
k
h he g e
e
a
building a self-defe e f ce ike a
a d
[wara ningyo]. 39
Director General Kimura of the National Safety Force protested
g
hi cha ac e i a i , a i g ha Ja a
f ce
ee
working hard.40
Once tempers had calmed, a more serious conversation on
egi a
c ce
di g ea a e de e ed a e i he
session. Two Socialist party members raised concerns that would
c i e
ef ec he
ii
a
ii
g e
e
rearmament planning for years to come. They also reflected the
philosophical divisions over rearmament that would ultimately cause a
break up in the party later in the postwar. The first came from the leftist
fac i
f Ja a
S cia i . Taka a Nah k a g ed ha
he
Japan abandoned its weapons could its security be truly achieved, and
she raised concerns about increasing the size of the National Safety
Force to transform it into a military. Director General Kimura disagreed,
arguing that both ground and maritime capabilities would be required to
ec Ja a
eace a d f eed . He c
e ed he S cia i Pa

一
十八号 予 委員会
一号 和二十八年十二 二日
Committee of the House of Representatives, 18th Diet, 13
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/018/0514/01812020514001.pdf.
38
一
十八号 予 委員会
二号 和二十八年十二 三
Committee of the House of Representatives, 18th Diet, 4
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/018/0514/01812030514002.pdf.
39 Id. at 13, 16.
40 Id. at 17.
37

[Budget
(1953)],
[Budget
(1953)],
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c ai , a i g ha e
-ha ded e a i
a a d ea a d a fai
tale [yume monogatari].41
The second Socialist came from the rightist faction of the party.
Amata Katsuo raised a more sensitive domestic issue when he pointed
he da ge f ha i g e be
f Ja a
e a iia
ake
the National Safety Force. Kimura took pains to respond to Amata,
pointing out that the government was paying close attention to the
personnel recruited for the National Safety Force as well as the National
Police, being careful not to go down the path of the old military cliques.
He e ha i ed Ja a
e ci i ia c
e ,a d e
ed ha
former military personnel were carefully evaluated based on their
personalities and skills. Only 26% of National Safety Force officers had
been recruited from the prewar military, Kimura reported, as he assured
Amata that there was no danger that they would dominate the
organization.42
The Diet finally a
ed he Y hida Cabi e
egi a i
creating a Self Defense Force and a Defense Agency that reported
directly to the Prime Minister. Two laws, the Self Defense Law and the
Establishment of the Defense Agency Law, were passed in the Lower
House on May 7, 1954 by a vote of 277-138, and in the Upper House
on June 2, 1954 by a vote of 152-79. Once formed, however, the
doctrine of this new military needed attention. Diet deliberations on how
Ja a SDF e e defe d Ja a bega i ea e
i h he Ha ama
Cabinet, which was in power from 1954 to 1956. In 1955, the Liberal
Party and Kaishinto would merge, and a new conservative party, the
Liberal Democrats, emerged to govern Japan until the 1990s.
Four five-year defense plans were completed by 1972, with
defense assistance provided by the United States. U.S. army forces
would leave Japan first as President Dwight Eisenhower began to argue
for greater reliance on the U.S. nuclear forces rather than forward
deployed forces in the 1950s. The U.S. Navy continued to be stationed
i Ja a , a did he U.S. Ai F ce. Ja a
e Ma i i e Se f Defe e
Force drew on the naval legacy of the prewar Imperial Navy, and would
operate alongside the US Navy thereafter. The new Air Self Defense
F ce ( ADSF )
k i e e ab i h, a d i a
i he id1960s that the U.S. Air Force would transfer responsibility for air
defenses to the ASDF.
十八
予 委員会会
五号
和二十八年十二 八 「参
」
[Budget Committee of the House of Councilors, 1-13 (1953)],
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/018/0514/01812080514005.pdf.
42 Id. at 14.
41
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Th gh
he
e
ea
f b i di g
he SDF
capabilities, Diet legislators would return again and again to query the
meaning of war potential (senryoku) and to press the government to
defi e he i i f Ja a
iia
e . The e i e f he igh f
self-defense continued to inform military planning, but time and again
the Japanese government needed to declare its commitment to an
e c i e
defe i e
i i
f
i
a
i i a . Die
deliberations would erupt in controversy over what types of weapons
the SDF used as well as the missions the SDF were assigned, while
Ja a
c e ai e
d
h
ea . A d a a , he
ever- e i i e e i
f he he Ja a ci i ia
ef
ed ade a e
oversight over the Self Defense Force would remain central to
legislative concern.
THEN AND NOW
Asia i c ea i g
f id ge
i ic ha d a
e e ed
a e i
Ja a
i i a ch ice . The Abe Cabi e ha i i ed a
series of security policy reforms, including the contentious 2014
decision to reinterpret Article 9 to allow the SDF to operate alongside
he a i a i i a ie . A a f
hi a e f c
Ja a defe e ,
Abe ha e c aged Die de ibe a i
e i i g Ja a c
i i ,
including Article 9. For some, this signals a shift in postwar pacifism in
Japan; and yet for others, it reflects the growing concern of Tokyo policy
makers over the growing use of military power by their neighbors.
And yet, the conversations today continue to echo the early Diet
deba e
e h
i e e A ic e 9 e ic i
Ja a
iia
power. The question of how to apply the spirit of Article 9 to the task of
idi g f Ja a
defe e i j a i
a
da a i a he .
Ja a
egi a
k c ide ab e ai
de i e a c e
what Article 9 allowed, and what it did not. Article 9 has never been
revised, and yet Japan maintains one of the most technologically
advanced militaries in the world. It remains a non-nuclear power,
however.
I 2019, Ja a
egi a i e ba a ce i fa diffe e f
ha f
the early 1950s. Then Japan Socialist Party remained a strong critic of
Libe a De c a defe e
ic h gh
he
a ea , i h
vociferous Diet members emerging to carry the torch of opposition to
rearmament. One of the most artful and successful critics was Okada
Haruo, a Socialist legislator in the 1960s. Similarly, there were
important conservative voices that continued to push the envelope on
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Ja a
iia
e . A Di ec Ge e a f he Defe e Age c i
1970, Naka e Ya hi a g ed f a
e a
defe e
[jishu b ei] policy, and as Prime Minister in the mid-1980s, he worked
with U.S. President Ronald Reagan to firm up the Western Alliance
against the former Soviet Union. Throughout his lifetime, Nakasone led
the civil society organization that championed constitutional revision. 43
Ja a
Libe a De c a ic Pa ha a ge ed he eff
build greater military self-reliance. The party consolidated and divided;
it continued to govern in coalition and then was replaced briefly by an
opposition party, and yet once more returned to dominate the Diet.
Today, the LDP-led Abe Cabinet is in a far more secure position in the
Lower House than the Yoshida Cabinet was in the early postwar years.
And yet, the same questions about just how much military power Japan
can deploy and for what purpose remain.
I 2014, he Abe Cabi e ei e e ed A ic e 9 a
Ja a
SDF to operate alongside other national militaries, relaxing a long-held
restraint on their ability to use force in a coalition setting. But by then,
the SDF had already been deployed abroad, in UN peacekeeping
operations and in coalitions led by the United States after 9/11. The U.S.
has continued in the aftermath of the Cold War to ask Japan to assume
a larger military role in regional and global security cooperation, and
cce i e Ja a e e i e i i e ha e e
ded Wa hi g
evolving burden-sharing demands. They have done so, however, with
Diet approval and with conditions imposed on where and how the SDF
could operate with U.S. and other allied forces.
Ja a
defe e deba e c i e
ef ec he c ce
ai ed
i he fi Die de ibe a i
h
i e e A ic e 9
ea i g f
he Ja a e e i i a . D i e b h b he a g age f Ja a
1947
Constitution, its relationship to the United Nations effort to eradicate the
use of force globally and by the emerging dynamics of international
i ic , Ja a
i icia f
d c
g
d
he
f
military self-restraint and the realities that shaped how Japan could
provide for its security.
Ja a
egi a
ha e e ea ed e
ed hi ea
i ica
deba e e A ic e 9
ea i g a he
gh
ada hei a i
defense policy. Alliance with the United States brought greater
Nakasone Yasuhiro (中
康弘), K k i ke
ei e e
ichi Nakasone
Ya hi
ke
ki eki (国 憲 制定への : 中
康弘憲
の
) [THE PATH TO ESTABLISHING THE JAPANESE PEOPLE S CONSTITUTION
THE
EVOLUTION OF NAKASONE YASUHIRO S THINKING ON JAPAN S CONSTITUTION]
(2017).
43
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assurance that Japan could defend itself if necessary. More than
anything, however, legislators on the right and on the left sought to
ec Ja a
e eig di c e i
e h
a age i
e
military. Article 9 served both to force politicians to return to the
e i e ha Ja a
iia
e hould have limits and to buffer
Japan from the incessant demands for greater military effort made by an
indispensable ally.

